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_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: Experiencing aesthetics and aesthetic experience has, for a long time, been perceived as the purpose and 
goal of art. The aesthetic features of a work of art have been the only criteria used in its evaluation. However, these 
modernist aspects cannot be applied to the conceptual and neo-avant-garde art of the 2nd half of the 20th century 
that has not only brought a radical change in the artistic form, but, especially, the ontological nature of the work 
itself. Modernist theories of art and normative rules which apply to perceptual art are no longer able to reflect the 
changes brought by the art of mind. The traditional history of aesthetics oriented towards the definition of art 
should, therefore, overlap with, for example, the history of ideas. In the text, I will thus focus on the crucial 
moments which stood on the border between the old, modernist traditions, and the new, which has brought radical 
changes into the study of aesthetics as well as the theory of art. The text is focused on three issues: ontological issues 
of art, the criticism of aestheticism and tautology as a possible problem in interpretation, which will be dealt with 
from the comparative viewpoint of the art of sense and art of mind. 
Keywords: conceptualism, aesthetics experience, neo-avantgarde, ontology. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
When Július Koller painted his “Sea” in 1963/1964, he probably did not expect that several years later it 
would be in the centre of a rather sharp academic discussion of Slovak art theoreticians. Koller painted 
this oil painting while still studying at AFAD in Bratislava and for a long time it was seen as an expression 
of a student’s search for himself. He wrote, or rather painted, the word “sea” on the painting and let the 
letters of this word “swim” on the waves. Although the painting does not depict any specific sea or the 
idea of a sea, it is able to very intensely evoke undulating waves in the audience. Despite the loss of 
materiality, replaced by a word, the painting has remained strongly visual. It is this very instability in the 
perception and interpretation of this painting that has become a meeting point for differing 
interpretational approaches. In 1979, Tomáš Štrauss termed “Sea”, in his samizdat manuscript “Conceptual 
Art as a Media Analysis and Model of Reality (Comments on the Development of Art from 1970 to 1975)”, as a 
unique phenomenon of Slovak conceptualism. (Štrauss, 1992, pp. 55-62) He came to this conclusion on 
the basis of the then current view in conceptualism which had also started to replace the visual aspect by 
thoughts, ideas or concepts, represented in the form of a verbal statement. However, Štrauss did not 
support his argument with any available foreign manifestos of conceptual art and assessed Koller’ work as 
an effort by the author to express his opinion on the conceptual and semantic issues of the current artistic 
trends through the painting. Radislav Matuštík totally rejected this in his work … Before. Crossing the Borders 
1964 to 1971 in 1983, while evaluating Koller’s work in a completely different manner: “[…] his painting 
“Sea”, however, is not yet a fully developed textual announcement of his relationship to things, events and ideas; it is only a 
first entry into a different – non-pictorial – symbolic system” (Matuštík, 1994, p. 27) While the first theoretician 
clearly classified the painting among the primary examples of Slovak conceptualism, the latter rather finds 
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it to be a continuation of the Dadaistic tradition of experimentation with writing in paintings. The 
interpretational discussion regarding this painting also continued over the following years and was joined, 
mainly, by Aurel Hrabušický (1995, pp. 218-251) and Jana Geržová (1999, pp. 145-149), who offered their 
own analytical viewpoints and interpretational evaluations of Sea.1 Their conclusions, but mainly the 
nature of the dispute itself raises several fundamental questions: Why has this, seemingly non-problematic 
and clear painting provoked interpretational disputes? Why have the theoreticians themselves found 
various paradigmatic aspects of artistic development in it and why have they approached it with different 
intentions? An answer to these questions corresponds to the situation in the 1960s and 1970s art. While 
subsiding modernist theories were still highlighting visual aspects and aesthetic features of works of art, 
which were highlighted by, for example, Radislav Matuštík, others (Štrauss), already in the spirit of 
conceptualism, were looking for an idea and thought in the work that was intended to completely replace 
the visual aspect with a semantic concept. I will try to gain more insight in this issue situated on the border 
between the old modernist tradition and the new conceptualism by defining two methods of the 
representation of the world which get their shape from art – the perceptual (sensory) and non-perceptual 
(conceptual) forms of art. Each of these forms has a different approach to representation, i.e. the 
depiction, of the world as well as to the medium used and the execution of the work itself, its formal 
features, visual aspect and meaning. There are also differences in their approach to the viewer and their 
place within the process of the perception of a work of art, i.e. to the aesthetic experience itself as well as 
to a definition of art. Based on these approaches, the individual artistic forms began to be called: art of 
sense and art of mind. While the first focused on the human senses which should be stimulated by a work 
of art, the latter focused on the artistic stimulation of the mind but using different means.2 They were 
discussed more intensely in the 1960s and 1970s when the question of a new definition of art and the re-
evaluation of modernist aesthetical theories (formalism, expressionism), which were not able to give an 
adequate response to the new artistic forms and strategies, resounded in the theory of art. The modernist 
theories pay attention to a priori art, its aesthetic and artistic qualities free of functions beyond aesthetics 
and art. They emphasize the autonomy of a work of art (Mukařovský, 2000, pp. 208-214), while 
highlighting its expressive and formal features (Clive, Beardsley). However, the situation in art has radically 
changed. Modernism emphasized sensory experience arising from art and artistic work, but the result of 
the rise of conceptualism (art of mind) was that aestheticism disappeared completely and was replaced by 
comments by artists on social or political issues, intending to make a viewer think, with the visual aspect 
excluded from the work. The principal difference between both of these approaches to art was not only 
based on the above mentioned factors, but, according to Noël Caroll, it was particularly based on the 
matter of aesthetic experience which is diametrically different in sensory and conceptual art. This question 
of aesthetic experience has been the one most highly considered question in the theory of art and 
aesthetics over the last 30 to 40 years (Caroll, 2003, p.. 42). It is related to the fact that sensory experience 
which is connected to beauty has, for some time, disappeared from art, this has been caused by 
conceptualism and other neo-avant-garde movements. A new challenge comes as a response to the 
deliberate absence of aesthetic experience – the re-evaluation of aesthetic experience. The term “aesthetic 
experience” originated in the early aesthetics of the 18th century (Baumgarten, Kant, Hutcheson) where it 
was related to terms such as contemplation, self-enrichment, internal experience. In the words of Vlastimil 
                                                     
1 For further information about this dispute see: Jablonská, Beata: Spor o slovenské „More” (2013, pp. 7-19). The author 
offers an overview of various opinions on interpretation of the work which have been pronounced in the field of 
Slovak art science.     
2 This terminology was also used by E. Schellekens and P. Goldie, authors of Who’s Afraid of Conceptual Art (2010).  
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Zuska: “the aspect of the self-reflection of a perceiver and the “internalization” of an aesthetic object, its absorption into a 
reflected perceptual sphere of subjectivity, are thus essential for aesthetic reception” (Zuska, 2001, p. 42). Several theories 
have been formed in modern aesthetics which focus on aesthetic experience as well as the emphasising the 
aesthetic features of a work of art, e.g. the concepts of Clive Bell, Susan Langer, John Dewey, Monroe C. 
Beardsley, Clement Greenberg and others. Aesthetic experience is a term connected to sensory perception 
and it is directly related to sensory art which possesses aesthetic features that are able to create an aesthetic 
experience. For Clive Bell, a representative of formalism, the perception of a work of art is not only 
simply looking. He raises it to an experience, in which the human mind is absolutely free, unbiased and 
free of any external stimuli. It is free of all other interests besides aesthetic ones. This intense experience 
results in an extraordinary emotion which is related to the origination of an aesthetic experience that can 
only come at the moment of experiencing an extraordinary emotion, which Bell calls an aesthetic emotion. 
A perceiver has to possess extraordinary sensibility in order to be able to experience such an emotion. We 
then call objects which arouse an aesthetic emotion, works of art. But why are certain objects more 
extraordinary than others and how do they differ from one another? The difference lies in the so-called 
significant form, based on the proper formal organization of lines, colours, forms and space. It is also the 
only principle that contributes to the evaluation of a work and to distinguishing a work of art from a non-
artistic work. The significant form is put into the work by an artist and the proper organization of forms 
in a specific work of art is always shrouded in mystery. An artist should be able to harmonize the 
significant form to such extent that it arouses extraordinary emotions in the viewer. At the same time, Bell 
points out that the aesthetic experience of a work of art is highly personal. Emotions are so individually 
subjective that no system of aesthetic can have an objective character. However, he also admits that any 
effort to search for objective truth in art is legitimate (Bell, 2005). We can also find aesthetic experience 
seen as the objective and purpose of art as well as the nature of sensory perception in the ideas of a 
younger theoretician, Monroe C. Beardsley. In his opinion, a work of art is “created in order to be endowed with 
an ability to satisfy an aesthetic interest” (Beardsley, 2010, p. 244). As soon as we start to show an aesthetic 
interest in artistic objects we deliberately head towards the aesthetic experience, which is a sort of climax – 
the highest moment – of the aesthetic experience of a work of art. “Sometimes it happens that, within the 
receptive relationship, we realize our experience (which includes everything that forms our consciousness, i.e. perceptions, 
feelings, emotions, instincts, desires, beliefs, thoughts) has been elevated in a way which can hardly be described: […] it 
includes the feeling of liberation from matters which present an external object of our interest, an intense feeling that is not 
based on practical objectives, an elevating feeling of awakening of our curiosity, unification of our selves and our experience” 
(Beardsley, 2010, p. 243). If all the above mentioned aspects of an experience join together when 
perceiving a work of art, we can speak about the aesthetic experience. The purpose of a work of art thus 
lies in the satisfaction of our aesthetic interest and leading us towards aesthetic experience – in the case of 
sensory art. However, what form does aesthetic experience and other aesthetic matters take in regards to 
conceptual art?  
In his article, The Problem of Non-Perceptual Art from 2003 (Shelley, 2003, pp. 363-378), John Shelley 
considers three statements: 1) a work of art has aesthetic features that are relevant enough for us to 
attribute an artistic value to the work (proposal R); 2) these aesthetic features are such that they can be 
perceived through the five senses (proposal S); 3) however, there are also works that cannot be perceived 
through the five senses – these are the so-called non-perceptual works and we evaluate them as works of 
art (proposal X). The first two statements correspond to the aesthetic theory of art and try to find an 
answer to the following questions: “Why do we assign an artistic value to a specific work? How do we 
perceive a specific work of art?” The answer is oriented towards the aesthetic features of a work of art that 
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we perceive by our senses which help us to assign an artistic value to the work. The third proposal speaks 
of works that we are not able to perceive through our five senses and cannot classify them among the 
sensory arts since they do not possess any aesthetic features. These works are beyond the realm of the 
concepts of the aesthetic theory of art; yet we evaluate them as works of art. Shelley forms variations of 
the three statements, on the basis of which he finds a possibility for the evaluation of such avant-garde 
works (Duchamp) that have freed themselves from aesthetic features and the possibility of perception 
through the five senses. Before we start to deal with the question of the existence of aesthetic experience 
in conceptual, or, in Shelley’s words, non-perceptual works of art, we will focus on some aspects of the 
theoretical concept of this art. We will, however, focus only on the early stages of the development of 
conceptualism where we can speak of it in its purest form. In the late 1970s, it was transformed into 
various forms with many differences and specifics, taking a form of neo-conceptualism in the 1990s. 
Conceptual art has been able to arouse many controversial claims and debateable questions. I will try to 
cover at least those which are closely related to the aesthetic issues that conceptualism tried to delineate 
itself from. At the same time, I will also focus on the ontological problem of conceptual art as well as 
dealing with sensory perception and aesthetic experience.  
Art after Philosophy?  
In 1969, Jozeph Kosuth, in a passage from Art after Philosophy (Kosuth, 1999, pp. 158-177), spoke of the 
end of philosophy, that it had exhausted its theoretical possibilities and was no longer able to grasp the 
fast pace of change of the world and art in the 20th century. The given state can be characterized by 
Kossuth’s claim: “The end of philosophy, the beginning of art” (Kosuth, 1999, p. 160). Prior to this period, 
philosophy had analysed the world via empirical exploration or rationalist analyses. According to Kosuth, 
today these procedures are no longer sufficient and are not able to fully grasp the changeability of the 
world. The same applies to aesthetics which interprets art from the point of view of aesthetic features and 
aesthetic categories.3 However, the artistic development of the 2nd half of the 20th century underwent a 
radical change, liberating itself from aestheticism, expressionism, artistic form and beauty as the most 
important aesthetic category. The importance of aesthetics – a scientific discipline dealing with sensory 
perceptions, aesthetic tastes and aesthetic values – was justified in relation to traditional art, as the art 
depicted and represented a certain aesthetic object which belonged to an artistic context; it was a part of 
the artistic tradition. “Art is a European tradition of pictorial and sculptural dichotomy” (Kosuth, 1999, p. 163). 
This state also corresponded to aesthetic theory, especially formalistic criticism, relying on the morphology 
of a work. If an artist respected the morphology of a painting, sculpture etc., they actually respected the 
artistic tradition; therefore, there was no reason to question the aesthetic value of the work.4 However, it is 
not possible to apply aesthetics and an understanding of the theory of art in such way to conceptual art, 
which rejected the traditional medium as well as the physical forms of a work of art, thus completely 
rejecting the modernist paradigm based on aesthetic categories. At the same time, the function of art also 
changed. The primary function of sensory art was decorative (portrait, landscape ...), referring to the 
morphological aspects of a work and oriented towards beauty and aesthetic taste. Yet, we cannot any 
longer look for a decorative function in conceptual works, which are called “pieces” by Kosuth. These are 
works created by a conceptualist without any ambition to be works of art. They are only models of the 
                                                     
3 The Kosuth’s claim is, of course, disputable since practice has shown that philosophy still has its place in social as 
well as in cultural context and is able to reflect both philosophical and artistic changes in paradigms.  
4 According to Kosuth, an American Modernist Clement Greenberg was the last Mohican of the modernist theory. 
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artist’s idea, and it is this very idea which presents an actual work of art. “Pieces” are only the physical 
form of the work of art that resides in the artist’s mind. The arousal of emotions, passions and feelings is 
no longer the role of conceptual works; its main task is to communicate an idea and be the bearer of 
semantic meaning. “An idea stands at the beginning of conceptual art and it is the most important aspect of the entire 
work,” (LeWitt, 1999, p. 12) these are the words of Sol LeWitt, which he used to characterize 
conceptualism. The creative process of the origination of the idea and its formation is much more 
important than the actual physical realization of the work. Conceptual art puts an emphasis on the 
intellectual process which includes all the intellectual as well as cognitive factors that support rumination, 
thinking, searching for connections and the actual realization, i.e. the external form of the work, is only 
secondary. “The mental process of an artist is sometimes more interesting than the final product” (Lewitt, 1999, p. 14). 
“A work of art is a tautology as it is an author’s presentation of their intention […] Art is art. The art is the truth a priori. 
If somebody says it is art, it is art” (Kosuth, 1999, p. 165). This statement by Joseph Kosuth was based on 
analytic linguistic philosophy as the only philosophical movement that conceptualism relies upon and 
which is close to it, by its nature. Kosuth refers to the thoughts of the linguist A. J. Ayer and characterizes 
a work of art as an analytical-analogical proposition. A work of art is tautological and, as such, a priori 
truth as it represents the artist’s intention, idea, concept, thus being art itself, a definition of art as well as 
its own interpretation. Similar to logic, mathematics and linguistics, conceptual art is a tautology with the 
given statement being confirmed by itself. In its form, conceptual art is also a linguistic statement; 
therefore, it is defined by itself and is interpreted in the same way. It is not possible to discuss a 
conceptual work in any other way but tautologically. If we tried to interpret it in another way, we would 
focus on other artistic aspects and not on the work itself. The art thus works on the principle of logic, 
which means it is close to scientific thinking, as a strict systematic character must be present in both 
systems. We also have to take a tautological approach to beauty itself, which is a tautological idea of clear 
and absolute existence, meaning that beauty has absolutely liberated itself from the external aesthetic 
features it was previously related with and has become an expression of the pure existence of the artist’s 
idea. As it is an expression of pure existence, Kosuth sees no point in commenting on beauty and paying 
more attention to it. As soon as we start to analyse it and search for its visual form, its pure function will 
change to a decorative one, thus causing its degradation. “An artistic idea and art can be appreciated as art 
without a necessity to prove it by their aesthetic features” (Kosuth, 1999, p. 166). Although, from a tautological 
point of view, art is at the same level as logic or mathematics, they are still different. While the scientific 
disciplines head towards a practical and useful objective, art is a pure existence that can fully replace 
religion or philosophy, as it is able to meet “the spiritual needs of man” due to the fact that “art is art. Art is a 
definition of art” (Kosuth, 1999, p. 170).  
Several fundamental questions arise from the aesthetic point of view of Joseph Kosuth’s theoretical 
concept, which I will try to highlight and compare in the scope of the art of sense and the art of mind. 
These are mainly essential issues such as the ontological problems of art; the new perspective of the artist 
in an artistic process where the artist – creator – is replaced by an artist – thinker;5 the problematic 
position of the viewer in the process of perception – the annulment of his perceptual experience; the 
                                                     
5 Elisabeth Schellekens says that the position and role of a conceptual artist is changing radically. They are no longer 
a creator, but a thinker; therefore, no painting or craftsman skills are required from them. As the conceptual art is 
based on semantics and not on the formal realization, the artist’s task is to be a “meaning-maker”, i.e. a creator of 
meanings.   
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meanings and objectives of interpretations of conceptual art – is there any point in entering it?; aesthetic 
experience and its place in conceptualism.    
The Ontological Problems of Art 
How does art exist? – a question asked by Reinold Schmücker – represents an issue for current aesthetics 
and the theory of art which was forced to take a certain approach to the state of art in the 2nd half of the 
20th century (Schmücker, 2010, p. 67). On one hand, the question is seemingly simple, not offering any 
complicated answers, related to the most common answer we can offer: art exists in the form of a work of 
art; its existence is a result of a creation of human subjectivity; the existence of such a work is to be 
perceived and refers to aesthetic experience. All of the above mentioned characteristics could, under 
certain conditions, be considered to be synonyms of art and a work of art. As has already been mentioned, 
modernist theories are of an opinion that “art is only constituted together with the realization of aesthetic experience 
and, furthermore, it does not exist outside this experience” (Schmücker, 2010, pp. 71-72). However, we can still find 
several problematic points in the answers to this question. The first issue arises when we connect the 
existence of art with its specific form, i.e. we assign a shape to it, an external form realized through matter 
or medium. The second issue occurs at the moment of joining the existence of the art with its subjective 
perception and aesthetic experience. These are the aesthetic constructs related to sensory art or aesthetic 
objects which can be perceived through our senses. However, the answers do not take into account arts 
without a material form or that does not use traditional media – art which only exists in the mind of the 
creator (or, as the case may be, in the mind of a perceiver), but also art presented in the form of a 
performance, a happening, land art and such like. How does this art exist? We can find an interesting 
answer in a study by Günter Patzing (Patzing, 2010, pp. 81-92), who says that we should distinguish 
between the existence of a work of art and the existence of material art (its material realization). It is 
irrelevant to differentiate between perceptual and non-perceptual art, because, as regards their ontological 
nature, all of them are born of an idea (medieval, renaissance as well as conceptual art). Therefore, the 
difference does not lie in the idea, but in the material or non-material realization. While in the first the idea 
is made real through medium or material, using various aesthetic means to help the perceiver the sensory 
perception and aesthetic experience, the physical realization of an idea is unimportant for the latter form 
of art. The existence of an idea is thus the ontological nature of art. “A work of art is not supposed to be a 
creative experience of an artist (creator, producer), but an experience of understanding and perception in a recipient” 
(Patzing, 2010, p. 90). According to this theory, the ontological nature of a work of art is only crowned 
thanks to the perceiver in the perception process. Jens Kulenkampff, who questions the existence of the 
ontological problem of a work of art, is of a similar opinion (Kulenkampff, 2010, pp. 93-107).6 In his 
opinion, it is a common practice in current art science to deal with the physical features of a material 
object by applying an aesthetic-oriented manner of observation which distinguishes the physical 
realization of art and its very meaning, or idea. As soon as this dualism is removed from art science, the 
ontological problems of art will also disappear. Like Kulenkampff, Patzing draws inspiration from Charles 
Sanders Pierce and his theory of words (type) – the bearers of meaning and tokens – the sound and 
written manifestations of a word, in his conception. They applied this dichotomy to art, namely to works 
                                                     
6 Kulenkampff presents a quote of Theodor Hetzer’s text where he describes Dürer’s early self-portrait: “As the 
famous Erlangen drawing – refusing everything that is typical of a bust – leaves only the face to appear before our eyes in a tangle of lines 
composed of fertile forms of paper, it also shows man who is disconcerted, asking, thinking, who is a riddle to himself. It is not a matter of 
isolation, politics, a deliberate attitude. Spirit and soul are immediately revealed in infinite movement” (pp. 96-97). 
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of art (type) and material objects (token) which bear aesthetic features. “Pierce’s distinction between type and 
token – interprets works of art as types that can, just as every type can, have many exemplars” (Kulenkampff, 2010, p. 
105).7 This means there are such works of art in the art world that can be perceived aesthetically due to 
their tokens, as they have aesthetic features and we head towards the aesthetic experience through 
perception; yet, we have to accept the fact there are also such works of art which do not possess any 
material form and only remain in the form of an idea. “The thesis that works of art exist here in form of types, 
therefore, has been adopted as more or less the dominant opinion in the field of art ontology” (Schmücker, 2010, p. 73). If 
we wanted to use the above mentioned arguments to answer Elisabeth Schellkens’ question,8 as to 
whether a medium was a necessary condition of the existence of a work of art, our answer would be 
negative. The material shape is not the only characteristic which ensures the status of a work of art. A 
similar opinion is also expressed by Joseph Kosuth who claims that ideas are considered to be the true 
works of art, not their material shape. In his opinion, art thus does not only have to be a question of 
beauty and aesthetic pleasure, but also a question of intellectual searching and thinking.   
Criticism of Aestheticism  
“Aestheticism is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the status of art” (Binkey, 2010, p. 283). The quote by 
Timothy Binkey breaks all the notions of traditional aesthetics that have been formed since the 18th 
century. Terms such as beauty, harmony and symmetry which are related to art suddenly seem to be 
completely absurd and superfluous. The same applies to terms like an aesthetic object possessing aesthetic 
features which allow us to classify an object as a work of art. Features which enable us to perceive, 
experience and assess a “perceptual object”. The modernist thesis advocates the opinion that a work of art 
exists so it may be perceived and the result is aesthetic experience. An equation – external perception = 
internal experience – applies here. Searching for an aesthetic ideal of beauty, the deep internal experience 
of art, intense aesthetic experience – terms and categories which cannot be applied to the art of the 2nd 
half of the 20th century that completely liberated itself from all aesthetic categories and traditionally 
understood aesthetics thus found itself in deadlock without the possibility to adequately reflect on current 
artistic shapes and forms. It happened in the case of conceptual art, but also in performance, happenings, 
land art, installations and so on, because works of art do not necessarily have to be aesthetic objects 
(ready-made), but they do not have to be an object either. This means they will not gain a material shape 
but instead only remain in the form of the author’s idea or creative process. As these works often do not 
possess any material shape, we cannot speak of any aesthetic or artistic value, and so Binkey, to the same 
as Kosuth, calls them “pieces”. The term “work of art” will thus be limited to “piece” (i.e. a work) 
(Binkey, 2010, p. 278). Sensory perception is no longer the meaning of “pieces”; it is replaced by grasping 
of an idea, albeit without a sensory percept, even without any aesthetic experience, because “art does not 
have to be aesthetic” (Binkey, 2010, p. 292) and does not have to be of an aesthetic nature – thus also the 
perceiver does not need any aesthetic experience either. However, if the work does not possess any 
aesthetic qualities, does it have some others, e.g. cognitive or cultural qualities? Cognitive theory has 
                                                     
7 Schmücker also thinks in the similar manner, claiming that various material forms of art allow us to physically 
perceive works of art; yet “they are not works of art themselves: they are tokens, i.e. occurrences or manifestations of a work of art. 
Consequently, the work itself is no material object, but it is a type which manifests itself in its occurrences, tokens” (Schmücker, 2010, 
p. 73). 
8 Elisabeth Schellekns: Conceptual Art. Freely available at Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conceptual-art/  
See also: Goldie - Schellekens, 2010.  
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offered one of the possibilities, pointing out the importance of knowing that does not only originate from 
logical/rational knowing, but also in art which, despite being more sensory than science, can be the bearer 
of cognition and knowing just the same. It thus disposes of a cognitive value. Cognitive-oriented 
theoreticians (Graham, Goodman, Freedberg) speak of art generally, not defining the special artistic forms 
which are the bearers of cognition and which are not (they define neither the art of sense nor the art of 
mind). We can reach cognition in all artistic forms. Nelson Goodman considers only cognitive knowledge 
and cognitive value to be the main nature of art. Aesthetic perception and aesthetic knowledge are not 
paramount or important to him, but they are replaced by cognitive perception and cognitive experience 
which are, in some way, superior to aesthetic experiences, since each artistic and aesthetic element is a 
source of cognition. “On one side, we put perceptions, viewings, arguments, presumptions – all the collected explorations 
and investigations, facts and truths; on the other, we put joy, pain, willingness, satisfaction, disappointment – all the 
thoughtless affective reactions, likings and aversions. Consequently, we do not see then that cognitive emotions operate in 
aesthetic experiencing […] Emotions in aesthetic experiencing are the means of determining the features a work has and 
expresses” (Goodman, 2007, p. 190). The emotions that Goodman speaks of are thus taken out of the 
sphere of purely aesthetic experience and we see them as a source of cognitive knowledge. Cognition 
becomes a new meaning and nature for conceptual art as well as for other neo-avant-garde strategies.   
Tautology as a Problem of Interpretation?  
Let us return to the concept of Joseph Kosuth who calls a conceptual work a tautology. It is thus a priori 
truth, it is defined and interpreted by itself and, as regards interpretation, it cannot be approached in any 
other way than tautologically. This characteristic brings several questions. 1) Why does such work need a 
viewer – perceiver – when it interprets itself? 2) Does a conceptual work admit the possibility of subjective 
interpretation at all, if it is interpreted tautologically? 3) What is the objective of our interpretations? In 
relation to the already discussed features of conceptual art, it is quite difficult to answer these questions. It 
might appear that the role of the perceiver is absolutely useless and they do not participate in the 
interpretation in any way. And it is out of place to speak of subjective interpretation, as it is a tautological 
process of self-interpretation. The existence of conceptual works as well as other neo-avant-garde 
strategies, however, is determined by interpretation and evaluation. According to Arthur Danto, there is 
the so-called “art world” (Danto, 2010, pp. 95-111), which a work enters on the basis of its evaluation and 
interpretation. A conceptual work is connected to a broad evaluation context which includes various 
cultural, political, historical and social relations. “Actually, works of art owe their status as art to the fact they are 
viewed as art” (Schmücker, 2010, p. 75). However, this is not only about subjective evaluations of 
individuals who could introduce a work into the art world. It is about a broad consensus that Schmücker 
calls “intersubjective agreement” (Schmücker, 2010, p. 77), i.e. an agreement shared by more subjects. The 
existence of at least one material manifestation in any form is necessary in order for a work to be 
evaluated in such a way. Even a purely mental manifestation which confirms the existence of a work is 
sufficient. How should Kosuth’s tautology be understood then? It does not minimize the role of a 
perceiver or even its denial. Like other neo-avant-garde works, a conceptual work necessarily needs an 
interpreter, but, since the work often does not have a material form (it is dematerialized) and works 
exclusively with an idea, the author focuses his, as well as perceiver’s, attention only on the concept (idea). 
The author tries to get the idea over to a perceiver, while the perceiver tries to understand it correctly.   
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In the present text, I have tried to point out the essential aesthetic problem which took shape during the 
period of the formation of conceptual art when a principal change in the artistic-cultural and aesthetic-
theoretical paradigms occurred that also led to a change in artistic norms. Theoretical texts by the 
conceptualists themselves (Kosuth, Sol LeWitt) form the primary basis for understanding the idea of 
conceptual art. These texts also came at the beginning of thoughts about the relationship between 
perceptual and non-perceptual art, and, based on the comparison of these arts, I defined three problematic 
spheres: the ontological problems of art, the criticism of aestheticism and tautology as a possible problem 
of interpretation. I particularly based my paper on texts of analytical aesthetics which demonstrate the 
wide discussion concerning the existence of the art of mind and its place in the art world. Today, their 
status is unquestionable and they are clearly accepted as artistic strategies that reflect both social and 
artistic conditions. However, with respect to the breakthroughs and internal tensions which occurred on 
the border between the old and new paradigms, I was interested in the moments which broke the 
modernist rules and norms and made an effort to offer new possibilities, be it in the context of a 
continuous follow-up or the discontinuous establishment of new rules of artistic reflection.    
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